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Abstract
Although rational consumers without bequest motives are better o⁄
investing exclusively with annuitized instruments in partial equilibrium,
we show the welfare bene￿ts of annuitization are ambiguous in general
equilibrium. Extending the optimal irrational behavior framework of
Feigenbaum, Caliendo, and Gahramanov (2008) to allow for uncertain
lifetimes, we further determine that for any investment rule that employs
only annuities there exists a welfare-improving rule that uses nonannu-
itized investments. For our baseline calibration, households can nearly
achieve the Golden Rule welfare within markets if they coordinate on a
rule that achieves utilities. Bequests improve consumption allocations
by transferring capital mostly to young people rather than to the old,
for whom the present value of the transfer is much less. Welfare can be
further improved if bequests are given only to the very youngest agents
instead of being spread uniformly across the surviving population. Thus
policymakers should not be so eager to encourage more annuitization by
the public.
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1Annuities, i.e. investment instruments that provide insurance against
mortality or longevity risk, present a puzzle to economists. In their simplest
incarnation, annuities work by giving surviving investors, on top of the ordi-
nary return, a premium that increases with the probability of dying. Deceased
investors surrender their investment, and these assets are used to pay the pre-
miums of surviving investors. Without bequest motives, rational households
are indi⁄erent to the disposal of their assets after death. Since annuities earn
a higher return, such households should invest all of their wealth in annuities
(Yaari (1965)). Even households with bequest motives ought to annuitize the
wealth intended to ￿nance their own consumption. Nevertheless, private an-
nuity investments account for only 1% of total household wealth for households
over age 65 in the United States.1 Although many researchers believe the near
total rejection of annuities by the public can be explained by accounting for
relevant frictions, this stylized fact remains a di¢ cult challenge for the rational-
expectations paradigm.
We consider the issue in a di⁄erent light. Most of the literature on annuities
is motivated by the presumption that people hurt themselves when they fail to
annuitize. In the basic partial-equilibrium model of Yaari (1965), this is cer-
tainly true from the perspective of a single individual, but is it true for society
as a whole in general equilibrium? If agents behave rationally, the answer is
ambiguous, depending on the parameterization of the model, though for our
baseline calibration welfare will be higher if households do not have access to
annuities. Within the framework of optimal irrational behavior (OIB) intro-
duced by Feigenbaum, Caliendo, and Gahramanov (FCG) (2008), the answer is
more straightforward. If households use a common rule of thumb, there exists
a rule of thumb involving nonannuitized investments that confers higher utility
than any rule that only employs annuities. In our baseline calibration, the
optimal consumption and saving rule can nearly achieve Golden Rule welfare.
These unintuitive results are a consequence of the pecuniary externality
(McKean (1958), Prest and Turvey (1965)), the property of markets that peo-
ple￿ s actions a⁄ect prices, which in turn a⁄ect people￿ s behavior. Although this
two-way causal relationship is the centerpiece of modern economics, economists
generally assume that households take prices as given and ignore the e⁄ect their
actions have on prices. The Welfare Theorems prove this is an innocuous as-
sumption for rational households in in￿nite-horizon, representative-agent models
1This is according to the 2000 Health and Retirement Study (Johnson, Burman, and Kobes
(2004)).
2of the macroeconomy. However, recent work (Feigenbaum and Caliendo (2009),
FCG (2008)) has shown that consumption and saving rules which take advan-
tage of the pecuniary externality can outperform individually rational rules in
overlapping-generations models. In the present context, we see this result ex-
tends to portfolio allocation rules that apportion savings between annuities and
nonannuitized investments.
Note that the bequest will be treated analogously to prices. Each individual
will view the bequest that he inherits as exogenous while the bequest that he
leaves is endogenous from his perspective. There will be a mapping from the
prices and bequest that households expect in planning their behavior to the
prices and bequest that arise as a consequence of their behavior. A general
equilibrium is a ￿xed point of this mapping. Thus in a model with uninsurable
mortality risk, the pecuniary externality can work through two channels: both
through prices and through the bequest.
Holding bequests ￿xed in a partial equilibrium fashion, households do better
investing only in annuities, but if everyone follows this strategy then nobody
can inherit a bequest. Bequests improve welfare by allowing better intertempo-
ral consumption allocations. Both annuities and bequests preserve capital by
transferring the assets of deceased agents to living agents. However, annuities
primarily transfer this wealth to the elderly, who receive the largest insurance
premiums. Uniform bequests transfer this capital across the whole population
and so primarily to the young, who are more numerous. A transfer received
when old will be more heavily discounted in the household budget constraint
and so can be used to purchase less consumption. The bene￿ts of bequests can
be increased even further if bequests are given only to the very youngest agents.
Social Security and de￿ned bene￿ts pensions are often likened to annuities
because they provide a constant stream of income that disappears when the
household dies. They di⁄er from annuities in one crucial aspect though since
that constant stream of income will only give rise to a constant stream of con-
sumption if households live hand-to-mouth, consuming all their income. Fur-
thermore, the optimal consumption pro￿le will only be perfectly smooth if the
interest rate exactly equals the discount rate from preferences.
Frictions would have to be quite severe to explain why households almost
completely disregard annuitized investments. As Bagchi and Feigenbaum (2010)
demonstrate, even with a tax or commission on the compensation of mortality
risk, households can still insure a signi￿cant portion of mortality risk if they
invest in annuities. Davido⁄, Brown, and Diamond (2005) show that the result
3of complete annuitization of wealth intended for own consumption is quite ro-
bust as long as annuities markets are complete. If uninsured investments span
a larger subspace of the state space than annuitized investments, it may not
be optimal to completely annuitize, though even then they typically ￿nd the
fraction of assets that gets annuitized is close to one. The literature is mixed
whether the mispricing of annuities, bequest motives, or other sources of idio-
syncratic risk, such as health expenditures, can explain the failure to annuitize
Pang and Warshawsky (2009) argue that most households would still bene￿t
from greater annuitization while Lockwood (2009) ￿nds that households with
bequest motives would be better o⁄ avoiding annuities at current prices.
1 The General Model
We consider a continuous-time overlapping generations model that gener-
alizes Feigenbaum and Caliendo (2009) to allow for an uncertain lifetime. This
embeds Regime D of Yaari (1965) within a general-equilibrium context as in
Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2008). At each instant, a continuum of agents of
unit measure is born. Their lifespan is stochastic with a maximum value of
T. Let Q(t) denote the probability of surviving until age t, which is a strictly
positive, strictly decreasing, C1 function. Denote the ￿ ow of consumption at
age t by c(t). An agent values allocations of consumption over the lifetime by
the utility function
U =
Z T
0
Q(t)exp(￿￿t)u(c(t))dt; (1)
where u(c) is the period utility function and ￿ is the discount factor, although an
agent may not be able to determine the optimal allocation without assistance.
We will restrict attention to the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) family
u(c;￿) =
(
1
1￿￿c1￿￿ ￿ 6= 1
lnc ￿ = 1
; (2)
where ￿ > 0 is the risk aversion coe¢ cient and more importantly the reciprocal
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. For all ￿ > 0, marginal utility is
u0(c;￿) = c￿￿: (3)
4At age t, the agent is endowed with e(t) e¢ ciency units of labor, which he
supplies inelastically to the market in return for the real wage w per e¢ ciency
unit. Thus labor income at t is we(t). The consumer allocates this income
between consumption and saving. He has a choice of two saving instruments:
annuities and risk-free bonds. The ￿ ow of bonds b(t) earns a ￿xed net return
r. The ￿ ow of annuities a(t) earns the return r plus an insurance premium h(t)
equal to the hazard rate of dying
h(t) = ￿
dlnQ(t)
dt
> 0: (4)
We assume for now that deceased agents bequeath their unannuitized wealth
assets to everyone currently alive.2 Let B denote this constant bequest. Then
the consumer must choose the consumption path c(t) subject to the budget
constraint
c(t) +
db(t)
dt
+
da(t)
dt
= we(t) + rb(t) + (r + h(t))a(t) + B; (5)
the boundary conditions
b(0) = b(T) = 0 (6)
a(0) = a(T) = 0; (7)
and borrowing constraints
a(t);b(t) ￿ 0 8t 2 [0;T]: (8)
The latter are necessary to prevent households from accruing in￿nite wealth by
exploiting the arbitrage opportunity that arises because of the higher return
paid to annuities.
To complete the model, we give the economy a Cobb-Douglas production
technology
F(K;N) = K￿N1￿￿ (9)
of labor N and capital K. The latter depreciates at the rate ￿ > 0. Labor is
supplied inelastically by households, so the aggregate supply is
N =
Z T
0
Q(t)e(t)dt: (10)
2We explore what happens if we loosen this assumption in Section 4.
5The supply of capital equals the aggregate of household investments
K =
Z T
0
Q(t)(b(t) + a(t))dt: (11)
Firms behave competitively, so factor prices must satisfy the pro￿t-maximizing
conditions
w = w(K) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
K
N
￿￿
(12)
r = r(K) ￿ ￿
￿
K
N
￿￿￿1
￿ ￿: (13)
Finally, in equilibrium we must also have the bequest satisfy the inheritance-
￿ ow balance equation
B
Z T
0
Q(t)dt =
Z T
0
Q(t)h(t)b(t)dt; (14)
where the righthand side is the value of nonannuitized wealth belonging to
recently deceased agents.
In the following, we are going to explore di⁄erent consumption rules and
compare their welfare in equilibrium. Thus we need to generalize the usual
de￿nition of a market equilibrium to encompass these di⁄erent consumption
rules. Following FCG (2008), we de￿ne a generalized (steady-state) market
equilibrium as a consumption rule c(t), a demand for bonds b(t), a demand for
annuities a(t), a capital stock K > 0, a bequest B ￿ 0, a real wage w, and
an interest rate r such that (i) the consumption rule c(t) and asset demands
b(t) and a(t) satisfy the budget constraint (5), boundary conditions (6)-(7),
and borrowing constraints (8) given B, r, and w; (ii) the capital stock K is
the aggregate of the consumers￿asset demands, satisfying (11); (iii) the factor
prices w and r satisfy the pro￿t-maximizing conditions (12) and (13) given K;
and (iv) the bequest B satis￿es the inheritance-￿ ow balance equation (14) given
b(t).3 This di⁄ers from the usual notion of a competitive equilibrium in that
we only require c(t), b(t), and a(t) be a⁄ordable and do not con￿ne attention to
consumption allocations that maximize the utility (1) given B, r; and w, subject
to the budget and borrowing constraints. We will call a generalized steady-
state market equilibrium that satis￿es this additional optimization condition a
rational competitive (steady-state) equilibrium.
3Here we abstract from population or technological growth, though it is straightforward to
generalize this concept to allow for a balanced-growth market equilibrium.
62 Rational Competitive Equilibriua
First let us review what happens under the standard lifecycle approach
in which households are individually rational. We consider separately what
happens if markets are complete and consumers can sell claims contingent on
their survival and what happens if consumers have no access to life-insurance
markets.
2.1 Complete Markets
A rational household proceeds by maximizing (1) subject to the constraints
(5)-(8) for a given set of factor prices r and w and the bequest B. This problem
has the Lagrangian density
Ld = Q(t)exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) + ￿a(t)a(t) + ￿b(t)b(t) (15)
+￿(t)
￿
we(t) + rb(t) + (r + h(t))a(t) + B ￿ c(t) ￿
da(t)
dt
￿
db(t)
dt
￿
:
The Euler-Lagrange equations for this problem are
@Ld
@c(t)
= Q(t)exp(￿￿t)u0(c(t)) ￿ ￿(t) = 0 (16)
@Ld
@b(t)
￿
d
dt
@Ld
@(db(t)=dt)
= ￿(t)r + ￿b(t) +
d￿(t)
dt
= 0 (17)
@Ld
@a(t)
￿
d
dt
@Ld
@(da(t)=dt)
= ￿(t)(r + h(t)) + ￿a(t) +
d￿(t)
dt
= 0: (18)
Together the last two conditions imply
￿(t)h(t) + ￿a(t) = ￿b(t):
Since we have assumed h(t) > 0 for all t, we must have ￿b(t) > ￿a(t) ￿ 0 for all
t. Thus a rational household will never invest in bonds (Yaari (1965)) in this
environment without intrinsic bequest motives.
Note that we introduced the borrowing constraints in Section 1 to eliminate
arbitrage opportunities and not because we were particularly concerned about
the debt of the debt (Feigenbaum (2008), Yaari (1965)). Here and in the fol-
7lowing, when only one of the two assets is held in positive quantities￿ in this case
the annuities￿ we ignore the borrowing constraint on that asset, which simpli￿es
the computation tremendously.
With this simpli￿cation, Eq. (18) reduces to
dln￿(t)
dt
= ￿(r + h(t)): (19)
This has the well-known solution
￿(t) = ￿0
Q(t)
Q(0)
exp(￿rt);
where ￿0 is an integration constant. Meanwhile, (16) implies
c(t) =
￿
￿(t)
Q(t)
￿￿1=￿
exp
￿
￿
￿
￿
t
￿
: (20)
If we de￿ne
c0 =
￿
￿0
Q(0)
￿￿1=￿
; (21)
the lifecycle consumption pro￿le will be
c(t) = c0 exp
￿
r(K) ￿ ￿
￿
t
￿
: (22)
Meanwhile, after setting b(t) = 0 for all t and B = 0, we can rewrite the
budget constraint (5) as
d
dt
(Q(t)exp(￿rt)a(t)) = Q(t)exp(￿rt)
￿
￿(r + h(t))a(t) +
da(t)
dt
￿
= Q(t)exp(￿rt)[we(t) ￿ c(t)]: (23)
After integrating (23), the borrowing conditions (7) then determine c0:
c0 = w(K)
R T
0 Q(t)e(t)exp(￿r(K)t)dt
R T
0 Q(t)exp
￿
(1￿￿)r(K)￿￿
￿ t
￿
dt
: (24)
Thus a rational household will use annuities to eliminate any e⁄ect of mor-
tality risk on the shape of its consumption pro￿le. The survivor function only
enters (22) to the extent that the expected present value of the household￿ s
labor endowment and consumption stream are weighted by Q(t) in (24). It is
8in this sense that we say that annuities allow the household to insure against
mortality risk. Conditional on being able to consume, the path of consumption
is independent of the realization of the time of death.
The demand for annuities is also determined by integrating (23):
a(t) =
Z t
0
Q(s)
Q(t)
exp(r(K)(t ￿ s))[w(K)e(s) ￿ c(s)]ds: (25)
The equilibrium capital stock Kann
rce is then determined by the market-clearing
condition
K =
Z T
0
Q(t)a(t)dt: (26)
Note that in the special case where r(K) = 0 the lifecycle consumption pro-
￿le (22) corresponds to the pro￿le of the golden-rule allocation described in
Appendix A.4 In general, the solution to (26) will depend on all the exoge-
nous parameters and will not satisfy r(K) = 0, though for a knife-edge set of
parameters the rational competitive equilibrium will abide by the golden rule.
2.2 Incomplete Markets
In the absence of life insurance markets, the budget constraint becomes
db(t)
dt
= we(t) + rb(t) + B ￿ c(t); (27)
and the capital stock is simply the aggregate of nonannuitized bonds:
K =
Z T
0
Q(t)b(t)dt: (28)
Now a rational household maximizes (1) for a given B, r, and w subject to
the constraint (27) and boundary conditions (6). In this case, the Lagrangian
density for the household￿ s problem is
Linc
d = Q(t)exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) + ￿(t)
￿
we(t) + rb(t) + B ￿ c(t) ￿
db(t)
dt
￿
: (29)
4The equivalence of c0 for the two pro￿les follows from the Income-Expenditure Identity,
which can be derived from the budget constraint (5), the technology described by (9)-(13),
and the inheritance-￿ow balance equation (14).
9The Euler-Lagrange equations for this problem are (16) and
@Linc
d
@b(t)
￿
d
dt
@Linc
d
@(db(t)=dt)
= ￿(t)r +
d￿(t)
dt
= 0: (30)
The latter has the solution
￿(t) = ￿0 exp(￿rt): (31)
Substituting this into (20), we now get the lifecycle consumption pro￿le
c(t) = c0 exp
￿
r(K) ￿ ￿
￿
t
￿￿
Q(t)
Q(0)
￿1=￿
; (32)
where again c0 is de￿ned by (21). In this case, the budget constraint (27) can
be rewritten
d
dt
(exp(￿rt)b(t)) = exp(￿rt)[we(t) + B ￿ c(t)]: (33)
The boundary conditions (6) then determine c0:
c0 =
R T
0 exp(￿r(K)t)[w(K)e(t) + B]dt
R T
0
￿
Q(t)
Q(0)
￿1=￿
exp
￿
(1￿￿)r(K)￿￿
￿ t
￿
dt
: (34)
Notice the di⁄erence between the lifecycle consumption pro￿le with complete
markets given by (22) and (24) and the consumption pro￿le with incomplete
markets given by (32) and (34). Under complete markets, the consumption
pro￿le only depends on the survivor function through c0. Mortality risk has
no e⁄ect on the shape of the consumption pro￿le, only on the level of consump-
tion. In contrast, under incomplete markets, consumption is proportional to
Q(t)1=￿, but the present value of expected income, i.e. the numerator in (34) is
not directly dependent on the survivor function.5 Thus in this case mortality
risk does a⁄ect the shape of the consumption pro￿le (Bullard and Feigenbaum
(2007), Feigenbaum (2008), Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2008)). As we will see
below, this dichotomy also carries over to the optimal irrational behavior frame-
work.
5In equilibrium, c0 will depend on the survivor function since the equilibrium bequest
depends on Q(t).
10Integrating Eq. (33) gives us the demand for bonds
b(t) =
Z t
0
exp(r(K)(t ￿ s))[w(K)e(s) + B ￿ c(s)]ds: (35)
An equilibrium is computed by solving the two remaining conditions (28) and
(14) for the bequest Bbeq
rce and the capital stock Kbeq
rce. The possibility for ine¢ -
ciency stemming from the absence of life-insurance markets can be demonstrated
by the fact that when r(K) = 0 the lifecycle consumption pro￿le (32) cannot
equal the consumption pro￿le of the golden-rule allocation in Appendix A, for
the latter does not depend on Q(t). Nevertheless, as we will see in Section 5,
there exist calibrations of the model in which expected utility is higher in the
equilibrium with incomplete markets than it is in the equilibrium with complete
markets, though both expected utilities are necessarily less than the golden-rule
expected utility.
2.3 Numerical Results
3 Optimal Irrational Behavior
The optimal irrational framework di⁄ers from the rational competitive equi-
librium framework in that the optimization now explicitly takes into account the
fact that K and B are a function of households￿choices. Instead of optimizing
utility with respect to budget constraints for a B and K and then determining
what B and K is consistent with the equilibrium conditions, we now directly in-
corporate the equilibrium conditions as further constraints on the optimization.
Our motivation for focusing on the optimal irrational behavior is quite di⁄erent,
however, from the rationale for optimizing in the rational paradigm. We are
not arguing that real households will have adopted the socially optimal rule.
The methodology we employ will reveal a whole continuum of consumption and
investment rules that do better than the rational rule. We consider the socially
optimal rule to determine how much room there is to improve upon the rational
competitive utility without abandoning markets.
First, we consider the optimal irrational behavior of the full model of Section
1. Since this is di¢ cult to compute numerically, we then consider the optimal
irrational behavior that arises if we shut down either the bond market or the
annuities market.
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Figure 1: Rational competitive equilibrium lifecycle consumption pro￿les for
the baseline calibration with ￿ = 0:5;1;3 for both complete and incomplete
markets.
123.1 Complete Markets
Under complete markets, the social planner will maximize (1) subject to
the constraints (5), (8), (11), and (14) and the boundary conditions (6)-(7). The
Lagrangian for this problem is
Ls =
Z T
0
fQ(t)[exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) + ￿(a(t) + b(t)) + ￿(h(t)b(t) ￿ B)]
+￿a(t)a(t) + ￿b(t)b(t)
+ ￿(t)[w(K)e(t) + r(K)b(t) + (r(K) + h(t))a(t) + B ￿ c(t)gdt
￿
Z T
0
￿(t)
￿
da(t)
dt
+
db(t)
dt
￿
dt ￿ ￿K; (36)
and the corresponding Lagrange density is
Ls = Q(t)[exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) + ￿(a(t) + b(t)) + ￿(h(t)b(t) ￿ B)]
+￿a(t)a(t) + ￿b(t)b(t) ￿
￿K
T
+ ￿[w(K)e(t) + r(K)b(t)]
+￿(t)
￿
(r(K) + h(t))a(t) + B ￿ c(t) ￿
da(t)
dt
￿
db(t)
dt
￿
: (37)
The Euler-Lagrange equations are
@Ls
@c(t)
= Q(t)exp(￿￿t)u0(c(t)) ￿ ￿(t) = 0 (38)
@Ls
@b(t)
￿
d
dt
@Ls
@(db(t)=dt)
= Q(t)[￿ + ￿h(t)] + ￿b(t) + ￿(t)r(K) +
d￿(t)
dt
= 0 (39)
@Ls
@a(t)
￿
d
dt
@Ls
@(da(t)=dt)
= Q(t)￿ + ￿a(t) + ￿(t)(r(K) + h(t)) +
d￿(t)
dt
= 0 (40)
@Ls
@K
= ￿￿ +
Z T
0
￿(t)[w0(K)e(t) + r0(K)(a(t) + b(t))]dt = 0 (41)
Since we will assume the bequest must be nonnegative, the ￿rst-order condition
for the bequest is
@Ls
@B
=
Z T
0
[￿(t) ￿ ￿Q(t)]dt ￿ 0; (42)
where inequality holds only if B = 0.
As in Feigenbaum and Caliendo (2009), we simplify this problem by decom-
13posing it into two parts. For a given B ￿ 0 and K > 0, we de￿ne the value
function for Subproblem (B;K) as
V (B;K) = max
c(t);b(t);a(t)
Z T
0
Q(t)exp(￿￿t)u(c(t))dt (43)
subject to the constraints
c(t) +
db(t)
dt
+
da(t)
dt
= w(K)e(t) + r(K)b(t) + (r(K) + h(t))a(t) + B
b(t);a(t) ￿ 0 8t 2 [0;T]:
K =
Z T
0
Q(t)(b(t) + a(t))dt:
B
Z T
0
Q(t)dt =
Z T
0
Q(t)h(t)b(t)dt;
and the boundary conditions
b(0) = b(T) = 0
a(0) = a(T) = 0:
In the event that there is no feasible choice of c(t), b(t), and a(t) that satis￿es
these constraints, we de￿ne V (B;K) = ￿1. We then solve the full prob-
lem by choosing the B and K that maximizes V (B;K). The Lagrangian for
Subproblem (B;K) remains (36) only now we view B and K as exogenous.
The Envelope Theorem and (41)-(42) then give us the derivatives of the value
function:
@V (B;K)
@K
=
Z T
0
￿(t)[w0(K)e(t) + r0(K)(a(t) + b(t))]dt ￿ ￿ (44)
@V (B;K)
@B
=
Z T
0
[￿(t) ￿ ￿Q(t)]dt: (45)
Note that the ￿rst-order condition for c(t), (38), is unchanged from the ￿rst-
order condition (16) for the rational competitive equilibrium. On the other
hand, if we combine the Euler-Lagrange equations (39)-(40) for b(t) and a(t),
we now get
￿b(t) ￿ ￿a(t) = h(t)[￿(t) ￿ ￿Q(t)]: (46)
14For the rational competitive equilibrium, we only had h(t)￿(t) on the righthand
side. This is the additional return, measured in utility, that can be earned
immediately at t by investing an extra unit in annuities as opposed to bonds.
This must be positive on account of (38) and our assumptions about the survivor
function. Consequently, a rational household would never invest in uninsured
bonds. A social planner, in contrast, must also consider the countervailing
term ￿￿h(t)Q(t). The factor h(t)Q(t) is the additional bequest produced by
investing an extra unit in bonds as opposed to annuities. This is weighted by ￿,
the shadow price of bequests, to determine the return in utility that is obtained
by this investment. Thus the social planner would advise households to invest
in bonds rather than annuities if ￿Q(t) > h(t).6 This situation, of course, can
only arise if ￿ is positive, but from (42) we see that at the optimal (B;K) the
shadow price must satisfy
￿ ￿
R T
0 ￿(t)dt
R T
0 Q(t)dt
> 0: (47)
The ￿rst inequality can only be strict if B = 0. For an interior solution, the
shadow price is the sum of marginal utilities across the entire lifespan, since a
uniform bequest provides a constant income at each t, divided by the population
the bequest is spread over.
One might naively conclude that (42) automatically implies that a rational
competitive equilibrium must be suboptimal since ￿ presumably ought to be
zero for the rational competitive equilibrium whereas the fraction in (47) must
be strictly positive. However, ￿ does not appear in the equations of motion
(38) and (40).that carry over from the rational competitive model with just
annuities. These equations revert to their rational competitive equilibrium
counterparts (16) and (25) when ￿ = 0, but it is not necessary to set ￿ = 0.
Indeed, the shadow price of bequests ought not to be zero when B = 0 precisely
because there is a bene￿t to having a bequest. As an example, the golden-rule
competitive equilibrium corresponds to a case when ￿(t) is proportional to Q(t)
for all t, and ￿ > 0 is the constant of proportionality. In this special case the
return from bequests or annuities is always the same.
What we can prove is the following theoretical result that generalizes the
main proposition from FCG (2008).
6Strictly speaking, ￿a(t) > ￿b(t) ￿ 0 only implies that the no-borrowing constraint on
annuities binds more tightly than the constraint on bonds. It does not necessarily require
that bonds be held in positive amounts.
15Proposition 1 Unless the allocation corresponds to the golden-rule allocation,
the social planner can strictly improve upon any generalized market equilibrium
in which annuities are held in positive amounts for all t 2 [0;T] except on a
subset with measure zero.
Proof. If annuities are held in positive amounts except on a subset of [0;T]
of measure zero, we must have that b(t) = 0 except on a subset of [0;T] of
measure zero, so B = 0. By de￿nition of V (B;K) then, if the generalized
market equilibrium has bequest B and capital stock K, it must confer expected
lifetime utility less than or equal to V (B;K). Let Sa = ft 2 [0;T] : a(t) > 0g
and let Sb = ft 2 Sa : ￿b(t) > 0g. Since ￿a(t) = 0 ￿ ￿b(t) for all t 2 Sa, we
have ￿(t) ￿ ￿Q(t) for all t 2 Sa. Furthermore, for t 2 Sb we have ￿(t) > ￿Q(t),
and for t 2 Sa ￿ Sb we have ￿(t) = ￿Q(t). Then (45) implies
@V (B;K)
@B
=
Z T
0
[￿(t) ￿ ￿Q(t)]dt =
Z
Sa
[￿(t) ￿ ￿Q(t)]dt =
Z
Sb
[￿(t) ￿ ￿Q(t)]dt:
Thus @V (B;K)=@B > 0 if Sb has positive measure, in which case utility can
be strictly increased by shifting some savings into bonds so there are bequests.
The only exception occurs when ￿(t) = ￿Q(t) except on a subset of [0;T] of zero
measure. This implies that
c(t) = ￿ exp
￿
￿
￿
￿
t
￿
(48)
for all but a set of measure zero of t. Since we are only considering smooth
consumption functions, (48) must hold for all t 2 [0;T], but this would then
correspond to the golden-rule consumption pro￿le.7
There is one caveat in this proposition that should be emphasized here.
While it is true that a rational competitive equilibrium will necessarily involve
only annuities, Proposition 1 does not necessarily imply that a social planner
can improve upon any non-golden-rule rational competitive equilibrium. This
is because it does not apply to such equilibria if both borrowing constraints bind
on a set of positive measure. The proposition would permit @V (0;K)=@B ￿ 0
for some K > 0 if ￿a(t) > ￿b(t) > 0 for all t in the subset of positive measure
that satisfy ￿(t) < ￿Q(t), though we have not found an example of such an
optimal borrowing-constrained equilibrium. Computing equilibria in which
both borrowing constraints may possibly bind is extremely di¢ cult and beyond
7See Appendix A.
16the scope of the present paper. Instead, we now consider what happens if
we shut down either the annuities market or the uninsured bond market, in
which case we can relax the two borrowing constraints without creating arbitrage
opportunities.
3.2 The Social Planner￿ s Problem Only with Annuities
If households can only invest via annuities, the social planner will choose
K to maximize (1) subject to the revised budget constraint
da(t)
dt
= w(K)e(t) + (r(K) + h(t))a(t) ￿ c(t); (49)
the capital constraint (26), and the boundary conditions (7). The social plan-
ner￿ s problem then has the Lagrangian
Lann
s =
Z T
0
Q(t)[exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) + ￿a(t)]dt ￿ ￿K (50)
+
Z T
0
￿(t)
￿
w(K)e(t) + (r(K) + h(t))a(t) ￿ c(t) ￿
da(t)
dt
￿
dt:
The Lagrange density is
Lann
s = Q(t)[exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) + ￿a(t)] (51)
+￿(t)
￿
w(K)e(t) + (r(K) + h(t))a(t) ￿ c(t) ￿
da(t)
dt
￿
￿
￿K
T
:
The Euler-Lagrange equations for this problem are (38) for c(t), which is un-
changed from Section 3.1,
@L
@a(t)
￿
d
dt
@L
@(da(t)=dt)
= ￿Q(t) + ￿(t)[r(K) + h(t)] +
d￿(t)
dt
= 0; (52)
and
@L
@K
= ￿￿ +
Z T
0
￿(t)[w0(K)e(t) + r0(K)a(t)]dt = 0: (53)
As in 3.1, we actually proceed by de￿ning Subproblem K, in which, for a
given K > 0, we choose c(t) and a(t) to maximize
Vann(K) = max
c(t);a(t)
Z T
0
Q(t)exp(￿￿t)u(c(t))dt
17subject to (49), (26), and (7). Again, the Lagrangian (50) remains the same
except we treat K as exogenous. Then the social planner chooses the K that
maximizes Vann(K).
The di⁄erential equation for ￿, (52), has the solution
￿(t) =
￿
￿0
Q(0)
exp(￿r(K)t) ￿
￿
r(K)
[1 ￿ exp(￿r(K)t)]
￿
Q(t); (54)
where ￿0 is an integration constant. Let us de￿ne
￿ =
￿
￿0
=
￿
Q(0)
c
￿
0; (55)
and recall our de￿nition of c0, (21). Converting marginal utilities to consump-
tion via (20, we obtain the lifecycle consumption pro￿le
c(t) = c0 exp
￿
r(K) ￿ ￿
￿
t
￿￿
1 ￿
￿
r(K)
[exp(r(K)t) ￿ 1]
￿￿ 1
￿
: (56)
Note that this is exactly the same consumption pro￿le as was obtained by Feigen-
baum and Caliendo (2009) without any mortality risk, although c0 is determined
by the instantaneous budget constraint (23) that we used in Section 2.1 and so
does depend on the survivor function:
c0 =
R T
0 exp(￿r(K)t)Q(t)e(t)dt
R T
0 exp
￿
(1￿￿)r(K)￿￿
￿ t
￿
Q(t)
￿
1 ￿ ￿
r(K)[exp(r(K)t) ￿ 1]
￿￿ 1
￿
dt
w(K): (57)
Likewise, the asset demand pro￿le is computed using (25).
The only remaining variable that needs to be determined to ￿nd the equilib-
rium is ￿. This is obtained by solving the capital constraint (26) for ￿. Note
that we must have
￿
r(K)
[exp(r(K)t) ￿ 1] ￿ 1 (58)
for all t 2 [0;T] in order for c(t) to be de￿ned for all t. Since the lefthand side of
(58) is increasing in t, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the consumption
pro￿le to be de￿ned is
￿ ￿
r(K)
exp(r(K)T) ￿ 1
: (59)
This imposes an upper bound on the set of ￿ we must search over to solve Eq.
(26).
18If we set ￿ = 0, (56) and (57) revert to the solutions, (22) and (24), for
the rational competitive equilibrium with annuities. Thus ￿ can be interpreted
as a measure of how much the consumption pro￿le that solves Subproblem K
deviates from the rational competitive equilibrium consumption pro￿le. Since
the rational competitive equilibrium solves Subproblem Kann
rce , it must be the
case that V (K￿
ann) ￿ V (Kann
rce ), where K￿
ann is the socially optimal capital stock
with no uninsured bond markets.
We refer the reader to Feigenbaum and Caliendo (2009) for a characteriza-
tion of the properties of the optimal consumption pro￿le with annuities. One
reason why one might expect this consumption pro￿le to be suboptimal if unin-
sured bonds are available is the fact that the optimal consumption pro￿le in the
absence of mortality risk is typically J-shaped. For most of the lifecycle, the
consumption pro￿le is decreasing, but just before the end consumption shoots
up to a much higher terminal value than the start value. This back-loading is
reasonable if the social planner knows the household will survive with certainty
until T, but it is problematic if most households will not survive to enjoy most
of its planned consumption. Annuities give a superior consumption allocation
than is obtainable with bequests if the consumption pro￿le is smoothed like in
the golden-rule consumption allocation, but a social planner who does not aim
to smooth consumption may do better with a rule that expressly depends on
the survivor function. This is the case that we consider next.
3.3 The Social Planner￿ s Problem without Annuities
In the absence of annuities markets, the social planner must choose c(t);
b(t); K, and B to maximize (1) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
(27), the capital constraint (28), the bequest balance constraint (14), and the
boundary conditions (6). Note that for this model we have to treat separately
the special case of a constant hazard rate h(t) = h since then the bequest balance
equation simpli￿es to
B
Z T
0
Q(t)dt = h
Z T
0
Q(t)b(t)dt = hK: (60)
Since B and K are not independent, the constraint quali￿cation will not hold if
we try to solve the problem with all three constraints. We deal with this case
separately below.
19The Lagrangian for the problem with a time-varying hazard rate is
Lbeq
s =
Z T
0
Q(t)[exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) + ￿b(t) + ￿ (h(t)b(t) ￿ B))]dt (61)
+
Z T
0
￿(t)
￿
w(K)e(t) + r(K)b(t) + B ￿ c(t) ￿
db(t)
dt
￿
dt ￿ ￿K:
The Lagrangian density is
Lbeq
s = Q(t)[exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) + ￿b(t) + ￿ (h(t)b(t) ￿ B))] (62)
+￿(t)
￿
w(K)e(t) + r(K)b(t) + B ￿ c(t) ￿
db(t)
dt
￿
￿
￿K
T
:
The Euler-Lagrange equations (38) for c(t) and (42) for B are unchanged from
the complete markets case in 3. The remaining equations are
@Lbeq
s
@b
￿
d
dt
@Lbeq
s
@(db(t)=dt)
= ￿(t)r(K) + [￿ + ￿h(t)]Q(t) +
d￿(t)
dt
= 0 (63)
@Lbeq
s
@K
=
Z T
0
￿(t)[w0(K)e(t) + r0(K)b(t)]dt ￿ ￿ = 0: (64)
Proceeding as in the previous two models, we de￿ne Subproblem (B;K) for
B ￿ 0 and K > 0 and compute
Vbeq(B;K) = max
c(t);b(t)
Z T
0
Q(t)exp(￿￿t)u(c(t))
subject to the constraints (27), (28), (14) and the boundary conditions (6). We
then ￿nd (B;K) that maximizes Vbeq(B;K).
Let us de￿ne
G(t) =
Z t
0
Q(s)exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))ds (65)
and
H(t) =
Z t
0
Q(s)h(s)exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))ds (66)
For this model, the solution to the ￿ equation (63) can be written
￿(t) = ￿0 exp(￿r(K)t) ￿ ￿G(t) ￿ ￿H(t): (67)
If we again use the notation c0 and ￿, de￿ned by (21) and (55) respectively, and
20we introduce the new Lagrange multiplier
￿ =
￿
￿0
; (68)
we obtain from (20) the lifecycle consumption pro￿le
c(t) = c0 exp
￿
r(K) ￿ ￿
￿
t
￿￿
Q(t)
Q(0)
￿1=￿
[1 ￿ ￿G(s) ￿ ￿H(s)]
￿1=￿ : (69)
The intertemporal budget constraint is the same as in Section 2.2, when we con-
sidered the rational competitive equilibrium without annuities markets. Thus
the demand for bonds b(t) is given by (35) and the boundary conditions (6)
determine c0:
c0 =
R T
0 exp(￿r(K)t)[w(K)e(t) + B]dt
R T
0 exp
￿
(1￿￿)r(K)￿￿
￿ t
￿￿
Q(t)
Q(0)
￿1=￿
[1 ￿ ￿G(s) ￿ ￿H(s)]
￿1=￿ dt
: (70)
With B and K ￿xed, the primary di¢ culty of solving Subproblem (B;K) is
to ￿nd the Lagrange multipliers ￿ and ￿. These are determined by solving the
constraints (28) and (??). Analogous to Section 3.2, we can restrict attention
to ￿ and ￿ that satisfy
￿G(t) + ￿H(t) ￿ 1 8t 2 [0;T]: (71)
Since G and H are both strictly increasing in t, for the case where ￿;￿ ￿ 0, a
necessary and su¢ cient condition for (71) to hold is that ￿ and ￿ satisfy
￿G(T) + ￿H(T) ￿ 1: (72)
Not surprisingly when ￿ = ￿ = 0, (69) and (70) become their rational
competitive equilibrium counterparts (32) and (34) from Section 2.2, where
annuities markets are also shut down. This special case must then be the
solution of Subproblem (Bbeq
rce;Kbeq
rce), which is therefore nested within the set of
optimal rules for each (B;K) that the social planner considers. Consequently,
generalizing the result from Section 3.2, we have V (B￿
beq;K￿
beq) ￿ V (Bbeq
rce;Kbeq
rce),
where B￿
beq is the socially optimal bequest and K￿
beq is the socially optimal
capital stock, both with annuities markets closed.
What does the socially optimal lifecycle consumption pro￿le look like? Using
21(20), we can write the growth rate of consumption as a function of the decay
rate of the instantaneous marginal utility ￿(t).
dlnc(t)
dt
=
1
￿
￿
￿
dln￿(t)
dt
￿ ￿ ￿ h(t)
￿
: (73)
From (67), (65), and (66), we obtain the decay rate of ￿:
￿
dln￿(t)
dt
= r(K) + (￿ + ￿h(t))
Q(t)
￿(t)
: (74)
In the rational competitive equilibrium, the Lagrange multipliers ￿ and ￿ van-
ish, and the decay rate of ￿ is just the interest rate, which is constant. Thus
the only time dependence in the growth rate of consumption comes from the
time dependence of the hazard rate. More generally, the decay rate will be aug-
mented by terms proportional to the ratio of Q(t) and dQ(t)=dt to the marginal
utility ￿(t). Expressing these ratios in terms of c(t) again, we obtain the law
of motion for consumption:
dlnc(t)
dt
=
1
￿
[r(K) ￿ ￿ ￿ h(t) + (￿ + ￿h(t))c(t)￿ exp(￿t)]: (75)
Since the new terms depend on consumption, we potentially get more interesting
dynamics for consumption than in the rational equilibrium.
Note that (75) reduces to the result of Feigenbaum and Caliendo (2009) for
the case h(t) = 0. Note that the e⁄ect of a time-varying hazard rate on the
consumption growth is ambiguous now. According to (78), ￿ must be positive,
so (holding c(t) constant)
@
@h(t)
dlnc(t)
dt
=
1
￿
[￿c(t)￿ exp(￿t) ￿ 1];
which is of ambiguous sign since ￿c(t)￿ exp(￿t) > 0.
Meanwhile
d2 lnc(t)
dt2 =
1
￿
￿
(￿c(t)￿ exp(￿t) ￿ 1)
dh(t)
dt
+ ￿(￿ + ￿h(t))c(t)￿ exp(￿t)
+ ￿(￿ + ￿h(t))c(t)￿ exp(￿t)
dlnc(t)
dt
￿
22d2 lnc(t)
dt
=
1
￿
￿
(￿c(t)￿ exp(￿t) ￿ 1)
dh(t)
dt
+ ￿(￿ + ￿h(t))c(t)￿ exp(￿t)
+ (￿ + ￿h(t))c(t)￿ exp(￿t)
￿
r(K) ￿ ￿ ￿ h(t) + (￿ + ￿h(t))
Q(t)
￿(t)
￿￿
d2 lnc(t)
dt2 =
1
￿
￿
(￿c(t)￿ exp(￿t) ￿ 1)
dh(t)
dt
+ (￿ + ￿h(t))c(t)￿ exp(￿t)(r(K) ￿ h(t) + (￿ + ￿h(t))c(t)￿ exp(￿t))
￿
:
(76)
When the hazard rate is zero as in Feigenbaum and Caliendo (2009), lnc(t)
must be a convex function of age, and so we get a U-shaped consumption pro￿le
in most cases. Here we see that the behavior of log consumption is more
complicated with a positive hazard rate since the sign of (76) is now potentially
ambiguous.
Finally, (64) and (??) imply that at the optimum we must have
￿ =
Z T
0
￿(t)[w0(K)e(t) + r0(K)b(t)]dt (77)
￿ =
R T
0 ￿(t)dt
R T
0 Q(t)dt
: (78)
In Appendix B, we show that we can solve (78) for ￿ to obtain
￿ =
￿0 [1 ￿ exp(￿r(K)T)] ￿ ￿
R T
0 Q(t)[1 ￿ exp(r(K)(t ￿ T))]dt
Q(0)[1 ￿ exp(￿r(K)T)] + r(K)
R T
0 Q(t)[1 ￿ exp(r(K)(t ￿ T))]dt
: (79)
3.3.1 Constant Hazard Rate
In the special case of a constant hazard rate, where h(t) = h for all t,
and Q(t) = exp(￿ht), the constraint quali￿cation is not satis￿ed by the above
treatment since B is proportional to K:
B
Z T
0
Q(t)dt = h
Z T
0
Q(t)b(t)dt = hK
B =
hK
￿ 1
h[exp(￿hT) ￿ 1]
=
h2K
1 ￿ exp(￿hT)
: (80)
23The Lagrangian simpli￿es to
L =
Z T
0
Q(t)[exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) + ￿b(t)]dt
+
Z T
0
￿(t)
￿
w(K)e(t) + r(K)b(t) +
h2K
1 ￿ exp(￿hT)
￿ c(t) ￿
db(t)
dt
￿
dt ￿ ￿K:
The Lagrangian density is
L = Q(t)[exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) + ￿b(t)]
+￿(t)
￿
w(K)e(t) + r(K)b(t) +
h2K
1 ￿ exp(￿hT)
￿ c(t) ￿
db(t)
dt
￿
￿
￿K
T
:
The ￿rst-order conditions are
@L
@c(t)
= Q(t)exp(￿￿t)u0(c(t)) ￿ ￿(t) = 0
@L
@b(t)
￿
d
dt
@L
@(db(t)=dt)
= Q(t)￿ + ￿(t)r(K) +
d￿(t)
dt
= 0 (81)
@L
@K
=
Z T
0
￿(t)
￿
w0(K)e(t) + r0(K)b(t) +
h2
1 ￿ exp(￿hT)
￿
dt ￿ ￿ = 0
￿ =
Z T
0
￿(t)
￿
w0(K)e(t) + r0(K)b(t) +
h2
1 ￿ exp(￿hT)
￿
dt (82)
c(t) = p(￿(t)exp((￿ + h)t))
d￿(t)
dt
+ ￿(t)r(K) + ￿exp(￿ht) = 0 (83)
Let us guess that
￿(t) = Aexp(￿r(K)t) + Dexp(￿ht)
Note that the case where r(K) = h, what we term the ￿silver rule￿ , needs
to be addressed separately.
d￿(t)
dt
= ￿r(K)Aexp(￿r(K)t) ￿ hDexp(￿ht):
24Inserting these into (83), we get
￿r(K)Aexp(￿r(K)t) ￿ hDexp(￿ht)
+Ar(K)exp(￿r(K)t) + Dr(K)exp(￿ht) + ￿exp(￿ht)
= [￿hD + Dr(K) + ￿]exp(￿ht) = 0:
Thus we have
(h ￿ r(K))D = ￿
D =
￿
h ￿ r(K)
:
Thus the solution is
￿(t) =
￿
￿0 ￿
￿
h ￿ r(K)
￿
exp(￿r(K)t) +
￿
h ￿ r(K)
exp(￿ht): (84)
￿(t) = ￿0 exp(￿r(K)t) +
￿
h ￿ r(K)
[exp(￿ht) ￿ exp(￿r(K)t)]
With CRRA utility (??),
c(t) = ￿(t)￿1=￿ exp
￿
￿
￿ + h
￿
t
￿
￿(t) = c(t)￿￿ exp(￿(￿ + h)t)
c(t) = ￿
￿1=￿
0 exp
￿
r ￿ ￿ ￿ h
￿
t
￿￿
1 +
￿
￿0(h ￿ r(K))
(exp((r(K) ￿ h)t) ￿ 1)
￿￿1=￿
De￿ne
c0 = ￿
￿1=￿
0 :
c(t) = c0 exp
￿
r ￿ ￿ ￿ h
￿
t
￿￿
1 +
￿c
￿
0
h ￿ r(K)
(exp((r(K) ￿ h)t) ￿ 1)
￿￿1=￿
(85)
Again, we de￿ne
￿ =
￿
￿0
= ￿c
￿
0.
Then we can rewrite consumption as
c(t) = c0 exp
￿
r(K) ￿ ￿ ￿ h
￿
t
￿￿
1 +
￿
h ￿ r(K)
(exp((r(K) ￿ h)t) ￿ 1)
￿￿1=￿
:
(86)
25The constant c0 is determined by
Z T
0
exp(￿r(K)t)c(t)dt =
Z T
0
exp(￿r(K)t)[w(K)e(t) + B]
Thus
c0(K;￿) =
R T
0 exp(￿r(K)t)
h
w(K)e(t) + h
2K
1￿exp(￿hT)
i
dt
R T
0 exp
￿
(1￿￿)r(K)￿￿￿h
￿ t
￿h
1 + ￿
h￿r(K) (exp((r(K) ￿ h)t) ￿ 1)
i￿1=￿
dt
:
(87)
Finally,
exp(￿r(K)t)b(t) ￿ b(0) =
Z t
0
exp(￿r(K)s)[w(K)e(s) + B ￿ c(s)]ds
exp(￿r(K)t)b(t) =
Z t
0
exp(￿r(K)s)[w(K)e(s) + B ￿ c(s)]ds
b(t) =
Z t
0
exp(r(K)(t ￿ s))[w(K)e(s) + B ￿ c(s)]ds
We determine ￿ such that
K =
Z T
0
Q(t)dt
Z t
0
exp(r(K)(t ￿ s))ds (88)
￿
(
w(K)e(s) + B ￿ c0(K;￿)exp
￿
r(K) ￿ ￿ ￿ h
￿
t
￿￿
1 +
￿
h ￿ r(K)
(exp((r(K) ￿ h)t) ￿ 1)
￿￿1=￿)
:
Note that
c(t) = c0 exp
￿
r(K) ￿ ￿ ￿ h
￿
t
￿￿
1 +
￿
h ￿ r(K)
(exp((r(K) ￿ h)t) ￿ 1)
￿￿1=￿
dlnc(t)
dt
=
r(K) ￿ ￿ ￿ h
￿
￿
1
￿
￿￿ exp((r(K) ￿ h)t)
1 + ￿
h￿r(K) (exp((r(K) ￿ h)t) ￿ 1)
dlnc(t)
dt
=
r(K) ￿ ￿ ￿ h
￿
+
h ￿ r(K)
￿
exp((r(K) ￿ h)t)
h￿r(K)
￿ + exp((r(K) ￿ h)t) ￿ 1
dlnc(t)
dt
=
r(K) ￿ ￿ ￿ h
￿
+
h ￿ r(K)
￿
"
1 +
1 ￿
h￿r(K)
￿
h￿r(K)
￿ ￿ 1 + exp((r(K) ￿ h)t)
#
26d2 lnc(t)
dt2 = ￿
h ￿ r(K)
￿
1 ￿
h￿r(K)
￿ ￿
h￿r(K)
￿ ￿ 1 + exp((r(K) ￿ h)t)
￿2(r(K) ￿ h)exp((r(K) ￿ h)t)
=
1
￿
 
r(K) ￿ h
h￿r(K)
￿ ￿ 1 + exp((r(K) ￿ h)t)
!2
￿ + r(K) ￿ h
￿
exp((r(K) ￿ h)t):
Thus if ￿ > h ￿ r(K) and ￿ > 0, log consumption will have a convex lifecycle
pro￿le.
3.3.2 The Silver Rule
For the special case when r(K) = h, the solution of (86) is not valid. In
this case, we guess that
￿(t) = (A + Dt)exp(￿ht):
d￿(t)
dt
= (D ￿ Ah ￿ Dht)exp(￿ht):
The di⁄erential equation is
d￿(t)
dt
+ h￿(t) + ￿exp(￿ht) = 0: (89)
Substituting our guess into (89),
(D ￿ Ah ￿ Dht)exp(￿ht) + h(A + Dt)exp(￿ht) + ￿exp(￿ht) = 0
D ￿ Ah ￿ Dht + h(A + Dt) + ￿ = 0:
Thus we have D = ￿￿, so
￿(t) = (￿0 ￿ ￿t)exp(￿ht):
With CRRA utility (??),
c(t) = exp
￿
￿
￿
￿
t
￿
(￿0 ￿ ￿t)￿1=￿;
which can be rewritten
c(t) = c0 exp
￿
￿
￿
￿
t
￿
(1 ￿ ￿t)￿1=￿: (90)
27In this case,
lnc(t) = lnc0 ￿
1
￿
[￿t + ln(1 ￿ ￿t)]
dlnc(t)
dt
= ￿
￿
￿
+
1
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿t
d2 lnc(t)
dt2 =
1
￿
￿2
(1 ￿ ￿t)2 > 0
4 Endogenous Bequest Distribution
In a competitive-equilibrium framework where all bequests are accidental,
there is little incentive to study how deceased agents should distribute their
assets across their survivors. One can, of course, study how welfare changes with
di⁄erent distribution schemes, but all such schemes give equally valid equilibria,
and there is no reason why we should expect an equilibrium that confers higher
utility to be selected over another, the same problem that arises in any model
with multiple equilibria. If, however, consumers are guided in their decision
making by a benevolent social planner, the social planner ought to advise his
charges to distribute bequests in an optimal manner.
Let B(t) be the bequest received by an agent at age t. For now we consider
the simpler case of a constant hazard rate h. Then the bequest balance equation
generalizes to Z T
0
Q(t)B(t)dt = h
Z T
0
Q(t)b(t)dt = hK: (91)
We also restrict B(t) ￿ 0. The social planner￿ s Lagrangian is now
L =
Z T
0
Q(t)[exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) + ￿b(t) ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿(t))B(t)]dt
+
Z T
0
￿(t)
￿
w(K)e(t) + r(K)b(t) + B(t) ￿ c(t) ￿
db(t)
dt
￿
dt ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿h)K: (92)
The Lagrangian density is
L = Q(t)[exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) + ￿b(t) ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿(t))B(t)]
+￿(t)
￿
w(K)e(t) + r(K)b(t) + B(t) ￿ c(t) ￿
db(t)
dt
￿
￿ (￿ ￿ ￿h)
K
T
: (93)
28The ￿rst-order conditions are now
@L
@c(t)
= Q(t)exp(￿￿t)u0(c(t)) ￿ ￿(t) = 0
@L
@b(t)
￿
d
dt
@L
@(db(t)=dt)
= Q(t)￿ + ￿(t)r(K) +
d￿(t)
dt
= 0
@L
@B(t)
= ￿Q(t)(￿ ￿ ￿(t)) + ￿(t) = 0 (94)
dL
dK
=
Z T
0
￿(t)[w0(K)e(t) + r0(K)b(t)] + ￿h ￿ ￿ = 0
￿(t)B(t) = 0
￿(t);B(t) ￿ 0:
The c and b ￿rst-order conditions are unchanged from (??) and (81) and
with CRRA preferences have the same solution (86).
The main new ￿rst-order condition is (94):
￿ ￿ ￿(t) =
￿(t)
Q(t)
= u0(c(t))exp(￿￿t):
If ￿(t) = 0 for all t, we must have
￿ = u0(c(t))exp(￿￿t)
for all t. This implies
c(t) = ￿
￿1=￿ exp
￿
￿￿t
￿
￿
:
This is only going to be consistent with (86) for the special case when r(K) = h,
in which case (85) does not apply. We deal with this silver rule case below.
Since K must be positive in an equilibrium, we must have B(t) > 0 for some
t and so ￿(t) = 0 for at least one t￿ 2 [0;T]. Clearly then
￿ = u0(c(t￿))exp(￿￿t￿):
For general t 2 [0;T], ￿(t) ￿ 0, so
u0(c(t))exp(￿￿t) = ￿ ￿ ￿(t) ￿ ￿ = u0(c(t￿))exp(￿￿t￿).
29Thus
￿ = max
t u0(c(t))exp(￿￿t).
Given the solution (86), this implies
￿ = max
t
c
￿￿
0 exp((h + ￿ ￿ r(K))t)
￿
1 +
￿
h ￿ r(K)
(exp((r(K) ￿ h)t) ￿ 1)
￿
exp(￿￿t):
That is,
￿ = max
t
c
￿￿
0
￿
￿
h ￿ r(K)
+
￿
1 ￿
￿
h ￿ r(K)
￿
exp((h ￿ r(K))t)
￿
:
The objective function is monotonic in t, so the solution either has t￿ = 0,
t￿ = T, or the objective is constant. If h = r(K), the objective is independent
of t, and we deal with this case later. If h 6= r(K),
d
dt
￿
c
￿￿
0
￿
￿
h ￿ r(K)
+
￿
1 ￿
￿
h ￿ r(K)
￿
exp((h ￿ r(K))t)
￿￿
= (h ￿ r(K) ￿ ￿)exp((h ￿ r(K))t):
Thus the objective is increasing if h > r(K)+￿ and decreasing if h < r(K)+￿.
In the latter case, all bequests are given at t￿ = 0. In the former case, all
bequests are given at t￿ = T. This case is similar to dynamic ine¢ ciency. The
interest rate is so low, that it is better to make bequests e⁄ectively disappear
from the economy.
For the calibration of ??, we have h = 0:011719 > r(K) = ￿0:00227. We
also have ￿ = 0:0198, so h < r(K) + ￿. Thus assuming the optimal ￿ and
r(K) remain nearly the same, it will be optimal to leave all bequests to the very
youngest agents. In essence, we can rewrite the planner￿ s problem so that the
boundary conditions are
b(0) = hK
b(T) = 0;
and the budget constraint is
db(t)
dt
= we(t) + rb(t) ￿ c(t):
30The intertemporal budget constraint is then
exp(￿r(K)t)b(t) ￿ hK =
Z t
0
exp(￿r(K)s)[w(K)e(s) ￿ c(s)]ds
Thus
b(t) = exp(r(K)t)hK +
Z t
0
exp(r(K)(t ￿ s))[w(K)e(s) ￿ c(s)]ds: (95)
In the silver rule case where h = r(K), (90) implies
￿ = max
t
c
￿￿
0 (1 ￿ vt):
Thus if v > 0 = h(K) ￿ r, t￿ = 0 whereas, if v < 0, t￿ = T. Thus the
determination of whether t￿ is 0 or T depends only on how ￿ compares to
h ￿ r(K).
4.1 General Case
Now let us abstract from the case of a constant hazard rate. The social
planner￿ s Lagrangian is now
L =
Z T
0
Q(t)[exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿(t))B(t) + (￿ + ￿h(t))b(t)]dt
+
Z T
0
￿(t)
￿
w(K)e(t) + r(K)b(t) + B(t) ￿
db(t)
dt
￿ c(t)
￿
dt ￿ ￿K: (96)
The Lagrangian density is
L = Q(t)[exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿(t))B(t) + (￿ + ￿h(t))b(t)]
+￿(t)
￿
w(K)e(t) + r(K)b(t) + B(t) ￿
db(t)
dt
￿ c(t)
￿
￿
￿K
T
: (97)
The ￿rst-order conditions are
@L
@c(t)
= Q(t)exp(￿￿t)u0(c(t)) ￿ ￿(t) = 0
@L
@b(t)
￿
d
dt
@L
@(db(t)=dt)
= Q(t)(￿ + ￿h(t)) + r(K)￿(t) +
d￿(t)
dt
= 0
31@L
@B(t)
= ￿(t) ￿ Q(t)(￿ ￿ ￿(t)) = 0 (98)
@L
@K
=
Z T
0
￿(t)[w0(K)e(t) + r0(K)b(t)]dt ￿ ￿ = 0
Only (98) di⁄ers from the original problem. The other equations are the same
as (??), (63), and (64). This implies that the solution to (??)-(63) is unchanged:
c(t) = c0 exp
￿
r(K) ￿ ￿
￿
t
￿￿
Q(t)
Q(0)
￿1=￿ ￿
1 ￿
Z t
0
exp(r(K)s)[￿ + ￿h(s)]Q(s)ds
￿￿1=￿
:
Eq. (98) implies
￿ ￿ ￿(t) =
￿(t)
Q(t)
= exp(￿￿t)u0(c(t)):
Since ￿(t) ￿ 0 and B(t) > 0 for some t 2 [0;T], we have
￿ = max
t
￿(t);
where
￿(t) = exp(￿￿t)u0(c(t))
= c
￿￿
0 Q(0)
exp(￿r(K)t)
Q(t)
￿
1 ￿
Z t
0
exp(r(K)s)[￿ + ￿h(s)]Q(s)ds
￿
:
c
￿
0
Q(0)
d￿(t)
dt
=
d
dt
￿
exp(￿r(K)t ￿ lnQ(t))
￿
1 ￿
Z t
0
exp(r(K)s)[￿ + ￿h(s)]Q(s)ds
￿￿
= (h(t) ￿ r(K))exp(￿r(K)t ￿ lnQ(t))
￿
1 ￿
Z t
0
exp(r(K)s)[￿ + ￿h(s)]Q(s)ds
￿
￿exp(￿r(K)t ￿ lnQ(t))exp(r(K)t)[￿ + ￿h(t)]Q(t)
= (h(t) ￿ r(K))
exp(￿r(K)t)
Q(t)
￿
1 ￿
Z t
0
exp(r(K)s)[￿ + ￿h(s)]Q(s)ds
￿
￿ (￿ + ￿h(t)): (99)
Unlike in the case of a constant hazard rate, ￿(t) is not necessarily a monotonic
function, so the optimal bequest distribution may not be to bequeath all leftover
assets to the youngest agents.
5 Numerical Results
32For our baseline calibration, we set ￿ = 0:3375, ￿ = 1, ￿an = 0:083,
￿ = 0:029, and T = 75.8 For t < TR = 40, the endowment pro￿le e(t) is the
same as in Gourinchas and Parker (2002). For t ￿ TR, we assume consumers
retire and e(t) = 0. We use the survivor function from Feigenbaum (2008). The
rational competitive equilibrium with complete markets gives Kann
rce = 87618 and
Uann
rce = 362:76. The competitive equilibrium without life insurance markets
gives Kbeq
rce = 79657, Bbeq
rce = 0:266, and Ubeq
rce = 363:04. Bequests constitute 6.2%
of expected lifetime wealth in this case. Although the competitive equilibrium
without annuities has a higher utility, the compensating variation (relative to
the complete markets competitive equilibrium) is quite small, only 0.11%.
The optimal social rule with annuities has K￿
ann = 130000 and U￿
ann =
369:56, which has a compensating variation of only 2.66%. The optimal so-
cial rule with bequests has K￿
beq = 140000 and B￿
beq = 0:847, which constitutes
17.87% of expected lifetime wealth. This gives U￿
beq = 384:2, which is a substan-
tial improvement over the complete markets equilibrium with a compensating
variation of 8.62%. There is very little room for improvement on the optimal
rule that can be achieved by abandoning markets, for the golden rule utility
is Ugr = 385:43, which has a compensating variation of 9.13%. Consumption
pro￿les for these allocations are given in Fig. 2. Note that for the optimal
consumption rule with bequests, c(T) tops out at 250, although only 1.7% of
the population lives to the maximum age.The spike as t ! T for the two opti-
mal irrational equilibria is clearly an artifact of the assumption that everyone
must die at T. It is not contributing signi￿cantly to expected utility since the
consumption pro￿le with bequests nearly coincides with the golden-rule con-
sumption pro￿le except within a neighborhood of T. Presumably, we could
remove the spike if we did not impose a maximum possible age.
A The Golden-Rule Allocation with Mortality
Risk
8For computational reasons, we are redoing these calculations in discrete time with a
period length of 0.1 years. The behavior of c(t) can get extremely nonlinear as t ! T, which
is problematic for approximating integrals. In discrete time, we can compute the solution by
exact sums. See Appendix C for details of this formulation of the model.
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Figure 2: Lifecycle consumption pro￿les for the optimal and rational allocations
both with annuities and with bequests and for the golden-rule allocation in the
baseline calibration.
34The golden-rule allocation would satisfy
L =
Z T
0
Q(t)exp(￿￿t)u(c(t))dt + ￿
"
K￿N1￿￿ ￿
Z T
0
Q(t)c(t)dt ￿ ￿K
#
L = Q(t)[exp(￿￿t)u(c(t)) ￿ ￿c(t) +
￿
T
￿
K￿N1￿￿ ￿ ￿K
￿
@L
@c(t)
= Q(t)[exp(￿￿t)u0(c(t)) ￿ ￿] = 0
@L
@K
= ￿
"
￿
￿
K
N
￿￿￿1
￿ ￿
#
= 0:
Thus we need
r(K) = 0:
Finally,
c(t) = c0 exp
￿
￿
￿t
￿
￿
: (100)
C = K￿N1￿￿ ￿ ￿K
Thus the equation
C = c0
Z T
0
Q(t)exp
￿
￿
￿t
￿
￿
dt
determines c0.
For the special case of a constant hazard rate,
C = c0
Z T
0
exp
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
+ h
￿
t
￿
dt
=
c0
￿
￿ + h
￿
1 ￿ exp
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
+ h
￿
T
￿￿
c0 =
￿
￿ + h
1 ￿ exp
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ + h
￿
T
￿C
Note that the consumption rule (100) cannot be achieved by rational agents
in a market with a positive hazard rate since that would require r = h whereas
r = 0.
35B Shadow Price of Bequests
From (67) and (14), we have
￿
Z T
0
Q(t)dt =
Z T
0
￿(t)dt
=
Z T
0
￿
￿0 exp(￿r(K)t) ￿
Z t
0
exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))[￿ + ￿h(s)]Q(s)ds
￿
dt
=
￿0
r(K)
[1 ￿ exp(￿r(K)T)] ￿ ￿
Z T
0
Z t
0
exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))Q(s)dsdt
+￿
Z T
0
Z t
0
exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))
dQ(s)
ds
dsdt
￿ =
￿0
r(K) [1 ￿ exp(￿r(K)T)] ￿ ￿
R T
0
R t
0 exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))Q(s)dsdt
R T
0 Q(t)dt ￿
R T
0
R t
0 exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))
dQ(s)
ds dsdt
Z t
0
exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))
dQ(s)
ds
ds = [exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))Q(s)]
t
0
￿r(K)
Z t
0
exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))Q(s)ds
= Q(t) ￿ exp(￿r(K)t)Q(0)
￿r(K)
Z t
0
exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))Q(s)ds
￿ =
￿0
r(K) [1 ￿ exp(￿r(K)T)] ￿ ￿
R T
0
R t
0 exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))Q(s)dsdt
R T
0
h
exp(￿r(K)t)Q(0) + r(K)
R t
0 exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))Q(s)ds
i
dt
￿ =
￿0
r(K) [1 ￿ exp(￿r(K)T)] ￿ ￿
R T
0
R t
0 exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))Q(s)dsdt
Q(0)
r(K) [1 ￿ exp(￿r(K)T)] + r(K)
R T
0
R t
0 exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))Q(s)dsdt
Z T
0
Z t
0
exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))Q(s)dsdt =
Z T
0
Z T
s
exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))Q(s)dtds
=
Z T
0
Q(s)
Z T
s
exp(r(K)(s ￿ t))dtds
=
1
r(K)
Z T
0
Q(s)[1 ￿ exp(r(K)(s ￿ T))]ds
=
1
r(K)
Z T
0
Q(t)[1 ￿ exp(r(K)(t ￿ T))]dt
36Thus the shadow price of bequests is
￿ =
￿0 [1 ￿ exp(￿r(K)T)] ￿ ￿
R T
0 Q(t)[1 ￿ exp(r(K)(t ￿ T))]dt
Q(0)[1 ￿ exp(￿r(K)T)] + r(K)
R T
0 Q(t)[1 ￿ exp(r(K)(t ￿ T))]dt
:
C Discrete-Time Formulation
Let us consider what happens in discrete time. Let ￿t be the length of a
period in years. We de￿ne ￿ = exp(￿￿￿t) and ￿ = 1 ￿ exp(￿￿an￿t), where ￿
is the annual discount rate and ￿an is the annual depreciation rate.
C.1 Social Planner￿ s Problem with Annuities
With annuities, the discrete-time analog to social planner￿ s problem from Sec-
tion 3.2 is
max
T X
t=0
Qt￿
tu(ct)
subject to
ct + at+1 = w(K)et +
Qt￿1
Qt
R(K)at
K =
T X
t=0
Qtat+1 (101)
a0 = aT+1 = 0;
where
N =
T X
t=0
Qtet;
R(K) = r(K) + 1
and w(K) is given by (12). The solution is essentially the same as in continuous
time except with di⁄erence equations instead of di⁄erential equations. If we
de￿ne
(n)q =
qn ￿ 1
q ￿ 1
37as in Feigenbaum (2005), we can write the optimal consumption pro￿le as
ct = c0
￿
(￿R)t
1 ￿ ￿(t)R(K)
￿1=￿
; (102)
where
c0 =
w(K)
PT
t=0 R(K)￿tQtet
PT
t=0 Qt
￿
(￿R1￿￿)t
1￿￿(t)R(K)
￿1=￿ : (103)
The demand for annuities is
at+1 =
t X
s=0
Qs
Qt
R(K)t￿s[w(K)es ￿ cs]: (104)
For a given K > 0, we solve Subproblem K by choosing ￿ such that (101) is
solved.
C.2 Bequests
The discrete-time analog to the social planner￿ s problem without annuities as
in Section 3.3 is
max
T X
t=0
Qt￿
tu(ct)
subject to
ct + bt+1 = w(K)et + R(K)bt + B
K =
T X
t=0
Qtbt+1 (105)
B
T X
t=0
Qt =
T X
t=0
(Qt ￿ Qt+1)R(K)bt+1 (106)
b0 = bT+1 = 0:
Let us de￿ne
Gt =
t￿1 X
s=0
R(K)sQs (107)
Ht =
t￿1 X
s=0
R(K)s+1(Qs ￿ Qs+1) (108)
38The optimal consumption pro￿le is
ct = c0
￿
￿
tR(K)t
1 ￿ ￿Gt ￿ ￿Ht
Qt
Q0
￿1=￿
; (109)
where
c0 =
PT
t=0 R(K)￿t[w(K)et + B]
PT
t=0
￿
￿tR(K)(1￿￿)t
1￿￿Gt￿￿Ht
Qt
Q0
￿1=￿ : (110)
The demand for uninsured bonds is
bt+1 =
t X
s=0
R(K)t￿s [w(K)es + B ￿ cs]:
For a given B ￿ 0 and K > 0, we solve Subproblem (B;K) by ￿nding ￿ and ￿
that solve Eqs. (105)-(106).
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